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We develop a general equilibrium model of vertical innovation in which multiple �rms
compete monopolistically in the quality space. The model features many �rms, each of which
holds the monopoly to produce a unique quality level of an otherwise homogenous good, and
consumers who are heterogeneous in their valuation of the good’s quality. If the marginal cost
of production is convex with respect to quality, multiple �rms coexist, and their equilibrium
markups are determined by the degree of convexity and the density of quality-competition.
To endogenize the latter, we nest this industry setup in a Schumpeterian model of endogenous
growth. Each �rm enters the industry as the technology leader and successively transits
through the product cycle as it is superseded by further innovations. The intrinsic reason that
innovation happens in our economy is not one of displacing the incumbent; rather, innovation
is a means to di�erentiate oneself from existing �rms and target new consumers. Aggregate
growth arises if, on the one hand, increasingly wealthy consumers are willing to pay for higher
quality and, on the other hand, private �rms’ innovation generates income growth by enlarging
the set of available technologies. Because the frequency of innovation determines the toughness
of product market competition, in our framework, the relation between growth and competition
is reversed compared to the standard Schumpeterian framework. Our setup does not feature
business stealing in the sense that already marginal innovations grant non-negligible pro�ts.
Rather, innovators sell to a set of consumers that was served relatively poorly by pre-existing
�rms. Nevertheless, "creative destruction" prevails as new entrants make the set of available
goods more di�erentiated, thereby exerting a pro-competitive e�ect on the entire industry.
�We would like to thank Thomas Chaney, Juan Carlos Hallak, Samuel Kortum, Eric Verhoogen, and Jonathan
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1 Introduction
Ever since Schumpeter (1942) laid down the mechanisms by which continued innovation of ever
higher quality products spurs "creative destruction", economists have viewed quality innovation
as a major engine of economic growth. Sparked by Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and
Helpman (1991a and 1991b), and Segerstrom et al. (1990), an in�uential literature has formalized
these insights and uses the resulting models to analyze the relationship between market structure
and growth.
An equally in�uential literature deriving from Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Shaked and Sutton
(1982 and 1983) argues that product quality is also one of the major determinants of market
structure itself, i.e., it is a means by which �rms di�erentiate their products from each other.
The Schumpeterian growth literature has, rather surprisingly, ignored this well-known di�er-
entiation motive for quality innovation. Such a limitation is especially striking when one considers
that in most vertically di�erentiated industries, multiple heterogeneous �rms compete.1 In these
industries, the growth of the average good quality is also a by-product of entrants’ desire to
di�erentiate their products from the competition by inventing higher quality goods.2
In this paper, we set up a framework that enables us to analyze how multiple �rms compete in
the quality space. We then show how �rms’ innovation decisions determine the density of quality
supply, equilibrium markups, and pro�ts in a multi-�rm environment of monopolistic competition
in quality.
In our model, growth arises through continued quality innovation by �rms, just as in Schum-
peterian growth models. A key novelty is that �rm entry also determines the degree of product
market competition (PMC). A high degree of PMC can only arise if entry to the industry is cheap
1For example, recent empirical studies in the �eld of international trade have documented that nearly all man-
ufacturing industries are characterized by many coexisting �rms with heterogeneous prices and pro�ts and that
this heterogeneity can, to a large extent, be explained by underlying heterogeneity in product quality. See, in
particular, Khandelwal (2010) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2010), but also Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Johnson
(2007), Verhoogen (2008), and Hallak and Schott (2009). Moreover, many industry-level studies document the fre-
quent coexistence of a technological leader and multiple laggard �rms. For example, Aizcorbe and Kortum (2005)
document how in the semiconductor industry, constant innovation of ever more powerful chips coincides with the
continued production of less advanced chips. Finally, Bils and Klenow (2001) provide direct evidence that in a cross
section of households, di�erent levels of product quality are imperfect substitutes in the eyes of consumers: richer
households typically buy more expensive, higher-quality versions of the same goods that poor households also buy.
2Starting with von Hippel (1988), numerous empirical studies have shown that in the private sector, much
innovational activity is directed towards unserved consumer wants. Indeed, Saha (2007) �nd that such innovation
is empirically more important for �rm growth than is process innovation directed toward lowering costs (see also
Sutton (1996 and 1998)).
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and, therefore, frequent innovation generates a dense quality spacing of �rms in equilibrium.3 This
�nding is the opposite of the existing literature, where the rate of innovation is strictly decreasing
in the degree of PMC, re�ecting the lower pro�t �ow of monopolists. We also show that “creative
destruction” may work via a pro-competitive e�ect rather than by displacing the incumbent.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. In the �rst, we focus on monopolistic competition in
the quality space. More precisely, we develop a model that is suitable for analyzing the density
of competition and �rm markups in vertically di�erentiated markets characterized by a large
number of active �rms. Our model explains how multiple seemingly inferior, low-quality �rms
can exist alongside the technological leader. The reason for their survival is that, although the
highest-quality good is preferred by all consumers, it also carries a higher price tag, which is not
worth paying for consumers with relatively low valuation for quality.
We document that market power of such low quality producers arises if the marginal cost
of production is convex with respect to quality. Consider, for example, three �rms producing
￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿3 under a marginal cost schedule that is convex in quality (the cost increment per
quality between production of ￿3 and ￿2 is larger than the cost increment between ￿1 and ￿2).
Next, consider the range of consumers whose willingness to pay for additional quality exceeds
the �rst increment but falls short of the second. These consumers receive a surplus by buying
￿2 at the marginal production cost instead of buying either ￿1 or ￿3 at any price exceeding the
respective marginal production costs. Because the producers of ￿1 and ￿3 never sell below their
marginal cost, the producer of good ￿2 enjoys positive market power. In this way, the convexity
of the marginal cost schedule generates market power for individual �rms.4
In the second part of our analysis, we endogenize the �rms’ location choice in the quality space
and analyze the resulting degree of competition under constantly growing income and valuation for
quality. Firms can incur a �xed cost to improve upon the existing qualities, and they are granted a
perpetual patent to produce the quality level of their choice. Each �rm enters the industry as the
technology leader and successively transits through the product cycle as it becomes superseded by
further innovations. The bene�t of entering with a higher quality good and the cost of doing so
both grow at constant rates, so that all entering �rms face a scaled but symmetric entry condition.
3In this sense, we go beyond Schumpeter’s notion that current market structure determines �rm pro�ts and
thus the incentives to innovate. In addition, we argue that the frequency and magnitude of innovations themselves
determine the “toughness” of competition, the market structure, and thus the incentives for further innovation.
4Shaked and Sutton (1982 and 1983) and successive work focus on the case where marginal cost is concave in
quality, hence implying that only one �rm can survive at equilibrium.
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We prove that in this setup, the conditions required for the economy to be on a balanced growth
path imply that there is a dynamic equilibrium in which each new entrant chooses a quality that
is a constant percentage higher than the incumbent technology leader.5
Upon market entry, a �rm chooses its quality level. In doing so, it aims to distinguish its
quality from those of the incumbents, as such isolation in quality increases market power and
pro�ts. Higher qualities, however, come at higher �xed and marginal production costs. Whereas
the former e�ect drives �rms to pick ‘remote’ qualities, the latter e�ect limits quality dispersion.
We also analyze how market size and the underlying technology parameters a�ect equilibrium
quality spacing, prices and quantities. We �nd that larger markets induce more frequent �rm entry
and a higher density of quality supply because higher sales and pro�ts allow a faster recovery of
setup costs. Markups, in turn, are decreasing in the density of supply and are thus decreasing in
the market size.
Surprisingly, a proportional increase in the marginal cost of production for all �rms in the
industry by the same proportion is associated with a more densely supplied market. The rea-
son is that, in equilibrium, markups are proportional to costs. Thus, when production costs
rise for all �rms, pro�ts actually increase for any given quality spacing. Excess pro�ts cannot
exist in equilibrium, and consequently, �rms must exhibit denser quality spacing and "tougher"
competition.
The third part of the analysis nests the above-described economy in a dynamic model of
endogenous growth with vertical innovation, as described by Aghion and Howitt (1992). We show
that long-run economic growth can arise from entrants’ desire to di�erentiate their output in the
quality space if, on the one hand, increasingly wealthy consumers are willing to pay for higher
quality and, on the other hand, private �rms’ innovation generates income growth by enlarging
the set of technologies available. In this way, the �rms’ research e�orts may generate exactly the
income growth that is needed to spur demand for quality.
This paper contributes to two broad literatures. First, it adds to the sizeable literature deriving
from Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Shaked and Sutton (1982 and 1983) that focuses on vertically
5In our setup, with a clear ranking along the quality line, there is a unique top-quality producer whose �rst-order
condition di�ers from the �rst-order conditions of the rest of the �rms facing two competitors each. The latter fact
substantially complicates our analysis, and therefore, we do not consider a simultaneous entry game as in Vogel
(2008). In models based on Hotelling (1929), one can avoid such border conditions because one can think of a circle
street or the beach surrounding an island. In our setup, however, any attempt to "close the circle" must fail, as it
would amount to identifying the highest quality good with the lowest quality good.
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di�erentiated markets in which natural oligopolies prevail, i.e., markets that are dominated by a
limited number of "market leaders".6
Our approach di�ers from this literature only in the underlying production technology. Exist-
ing studies assume that the marginal cost of production increases only moderately with quality,
which enables high-quality �rms to out-price low-quality competitors.7Whenever this condition
is violated, heterogeneous consumers may di�er in their individual ranking of variety-price pairs.
Shaked and Sutton (1983) do not analyze this case, which would, given their assumption of cost-
less market entry, imply entry of unaccountably many �rms and competitive pricing along a dense
set of qualities. In the present paper, we analyze the case where the marginal cost of production
does increase su�ciently in quality, while explicitly modeling the �rms’ quality choice under the
standard assumption of costly market entry.
Second, our model is also relevant to the static and the dynamic aspects of the literature
analyzing the product market competition (PMC) and growth nexus. The principal di�erence
between the classical Schumpeterian growth models described by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
our approach is that, whereas existing work focuses on the supply side of technical change (i.e.,
innovation as a means to reduce costs and undercut the competition), we investigate the impor-
tance of consumer preferences and the latent demand for new products as a driver of aggregate
growth.
In our approach, �rm innovation creates growth because innovational e�orts are directed
toward consumer preferences for higher quality goods. This motive for innovation is akin to
the one in the literature on the direction of technical change. For example, Acemoglu (1998,
2002, and 2007) argue that a growing supply of skilled labor generates incentives to invest in
technology directed toward that factor of production, and Acemoglu (forthcoming) analyzes the
general conditions under which the scarcity of a factor encourages technological progress directed
towards it.8 Similarly, we focus on how the direction of technological advance tracks the evolution
of consumer preferences: as consumer valuations grow over time, the market for higher-quality
6See also Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Sutton (2007) and (2007a) for the case of one-�rm environments, and
see Champsaur and Rochet (1989) for the duopolistic case.
7See Lahmandi-Ayed (2000 and 2004) for an extensive discussion of the conditions of technology that induce
natural oligopolies.
8There exists ample empirical evidence for the importance of these considerations for the direction of innovation.
Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) document that in the case of the health sector, changes in the relative cost of
labor had pronounced e�ects on the adoption of new labor saving technologies. Newell et al. (1999) and Popp
(2002) document that energy prices have strong e�ects on the innovation of energy-saving technologies.
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goods expands, creating technological advances directed towards higher-quality goods.
This principal di�erence in the motivation of �rms to conduct costly R&D is associated with
two key novel implications of our results compared to the existing literature. First, in our setup,
the degree of product market competition (PMC) and the frequency of innovation are jointly
determined. Whereas the existing literature introduces PMC via exogenous parameters, in our
setup, the degree of PMC is determined endogenously, arising from the entrant’s decision to
di�erentiate its product from existing goods.
In the classical Schumpeterian growth models, the rate of innovation is strictly decreasing in
PMC, re�ecting the lower pro�t �ow of monopolists. In our approach, this �nding is reversed: a
high degree of PMC can only arise if entry to the industry is cheap and if, therefore, innovation
happens frequently. In this sense, the incentives to innovate in our model are related to the
"escape competition" motive for R&D in Aghion et al. (2001) (see also Aghion et al. (1997)
and Aghion et al. (2005) and in the informal discussion in Boldrin and Levine (2004)), where
incumbent �rms innovate to increase their cost advantage over lagging imitators.
There exists a fundamental di�erence, however, between frameworks such as that of Aghion
et al. (2001) and our approach. Whereas these existing frameworks focus on cost-innovation in a
setup where government policy can directly a�ect the degree of substitutability between products
(for example, the elasticity of substitution between di�erent goods is a direct policy choice in
Aghion et al. (2001)), we take the view that the degree of good substitutability is the result of
�rms’ location choice in the quality space. Our main focus, then, is to analyze how post-innovation
substitutability itself is shaped by the degree to which innovators distinguish their products from
existing ones given a set of entry barriers and input costs.
The second novel implication concerns the nature of "creative destruction" and the mechanisms
through which innovating �rms create aggregate innovation (see Klette and Kortum (2004)). In
existing Schumpeterian growth models, innovation occurs because it allows entrants to displace
the incumbent �rm. Our setup does not necessarily feature such a "business stealing" e�ect in
the sense that already marginal innovations grant non-negligible pro�ts. Instead, innovators sell
only to a set of consumers that was served relatively poorly by pre-existing �rms.
Creative destruction does, however, prevail due to the pro-competitive e�ect of entry. New
entrants make the set of available goods more di�erentiated, which is shown to reduce the market
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power of all �rms so that in equilibrium, �rm entry exerts a pro-competitive e�ect on the entire
industry. Margins are thus strictly decreasing in entry.
Our model also features a product life cycle, where each �rm enters the industry as the
technology leader and successively becomes superseded by further innovations. As it transits
through this life cycle, each �rm’s margins are depressed with every new entry. The latter entry
e�ect, however, also becomes smaller and smaller as the �rm becomes su�ciently "backwards"
and is no longer much a�ected by high-quality entry. The �rm’s markups asymptotically approach
a positive value that is determined only by the quality spacing.9
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section, 2, we present some empirical
evidence on the relation between patenting and markups. In Section 3, we develop a theoretical
model of competition in the quality space. We examine the static predictions of this model in
subsection 3.2. We next analyze free entry decisions and the stationary equilibria in 4. Finally,
we endogenize the growth rate in Section 5 before describing our conclusions in Section 6.
2 A Brief Look at Innovation and Product Market Competition
in Europe
In developing our theory, we are motivated by the fact that in most vertically di�erentiated
industries, a wide set of �rms coexist, providing goods of heterogeneous quality. Furthermore,
we are able to match the product life cycle that results from �rms’ continued innovation of
higher product qualities. More importantly, however, our model has implications for one of
the fundamental questions of the Schumpeterian growth literature: the link between PMC and
economic growth.
In this respect, the most salient feature of our theory is that the degree of PMC emerges
endogenously via the frequency of entry and, ultimately, through the costs of market entry. This
direction of causality implies that a higher frequency of �rm entry generates higher PMC, as �rms
squeeze together more densely in the quality space. In contrast, models in the spirit of Aghion and
Howitt (1992) generally explore causality in the reverse direction, predicting that (exogenously
9The model also features the substitution and complementarity e�ects of innovation and the product life cycle
�rst analyzed in Young (1993). In our model, as new innovation occurs, the economy grows, and consumer valuations
increase. This growth has two consequences: �rst, because it raises the average willingness to pay for quality, prices
increase. Second, as the support of the valuation distribution grows, its density thins out, and any �rm serving a
�xed range of consumer valuations thus serves fewer customers.
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given) higher pro�t margins attract more �rms, which enter markets at a higher frequency.10
Clearly, the correlation between PMC and the frequency of �rm entry could empirically dis-
cern these two motivations for product innovation. Therefore, we take a brief look at these two
variables.
Does PMC relate positively or negatively to the frequency of �rm entry? To shed light on this
question, we use the demand elasticity estimated by Broda et al. (2006) to measure the degree of
equilibrium PMC, exploiting the variation along the country and the industry dimension. On the
other side, we use patenting activity as a gauge of the frequency of industry-speci�c �rm entry
or, reading our theory a bit more generally, as a measure of product innovation.
For our empirical exercise, we use the patenting data from Johnson (2002), who reports the
number of patents issued in 66 manufacturing and commodity sectors for six European countries
(Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and United Kingdom). International patent
data is usually categorized according to the International Patenting Classi�cation (IPC) scheme,
which the Yale/OECD technology concordance maps into international standards industry codes
(ISICs). This concordance table is constructed by Johnson and Evanson (1997) following the
methodology of Kortum and Putnam (1994), and it maps IPC codes into the ISIC sectors that
actually use the patents ("sectors of end use"). Thus, the resulting dataset of patents at the ISIC
level correlates well with the actual adoption of new technologies in these ISIC sectors.
The 66 ISIC sectors from Johnson (2002) are classi�ed at various levels of disaggregation.
They include four observations at the "section" level, 31 2-digit industries, 17 3-digit industries,
and 14 4-digit industries, hence resulting in fewer than 66 independent observations. Taking this
limitation into account, we can concord 38 of the sectors reported by Johnson with the demand
elasticities from Broda et al. (2006) that are reported at the 3-digit level of disaggregation in
the Harmonized System (HS). Johnson (2002) report patenting data for 1998, which happens to
be near the midpoint of the time interval of the trade data (1993 to 2004) used by Broda et al.
(2006) to construct their trade demand elasticity estimates.
Having matched demand elasticities and innovation rates for 38 di�erent sectors, it is essential
that we apply a consistent rule to classify the industries into two groups, the �rst of "vertically
di�erentiated" goods and the remainder, which we simply refer to as "horizontally di�erentiated".
The most convincing criterion for vertical di�erentiation is developed by Bils and Klenow (2001),
10Aghion et al. (2001) predict an inverted U-shape relation between the two variables.
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who directly estimate the steepness of the Engel curve utilizing the cross section of household
incomes and the associated spending for discrete choice durable goods such as cars or television sets
in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ "Consumer Expenditure Survey". We match the Harmonized
System codes to the Bils and Klenow (2001) set of durable goods.11
The disadvantage of following this methodology is that the resulting concordance of Bils and
Klenow (2001) goods to HS 3-digit sectors is rather rough because Bils and Klenow (2001) focus on
consumption goods such as telephones, TVs, rugs, and multiple apparel goods (e.g., men’s suits,
women’s dresses). In many cases, multiple Bils and Klenow goods fall into the same industry,
so that we can identify only 8 of the 38 industries use "vertically di�erentiated" goods: steel,
manufacturing of motor vehicles, precious metals, o�ce machinery, television and radio receivers,
wearing apparel, and wood products (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a list of all 38 sectors and
their classi�cation).
Figure 1 demonstrates that in these vertically di�erentiated industries, more patenting is
associated with a higher degree of PMC. This �gure relates the logarithm of the elasticity of
substitution in 48 industry-country pairs (eight industries and six countries) to the logarithm of
the number of patents issued in 1998 in the respective country-industry pair.12
11The 66 durable goods discussed in Bils and Klenow (2001) are not classi�ed by a standard classi�cation scheme.
To match this data, we used a text search matching the verbal description of their data with the universe of the
6-digit 1992 HS good classes. In most cases, we coule uniquely match them to one 6-digit class, except for the case
of "Hard Flooring", for which we instead searched for "parquet".
12There are a few sector-country observations with 0 patents. We therefore de�ne the logarithm of patents as
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Figure 1
The scatter plot displays a clear positive correlation between these two variables. Because
markups are a negative function of the elasticity of substitution, this correlation implies that
industries characterized by more product innovation have lower markups, as opposed to the pre-
diction of the standard Schumpeterian model. There is one clear outlier (cars and car parts made
in Italy, with an elasticity of 669), but the inclusion or exclusion of this observation does not alter
the qualitative picture.
Table 1 examines whether the correlation depicted in Figure 1 is statistically signi�cant and
whether it is driven by country-speci�c factors. In all estimations, the dependent variable is the
logarithm of the Broda et al. (2006) demand elasticity. In Column (1), only the logarithm of the
number of patents granted in 1998 is added as dependent variable, and the sample includes the
47 (six times eight country-industry pairs minus one outlier) vertically di�erentiated industries.
The positive raw correlation between these two variables is indeed statistically signi�cant, and
the estimated elasticity of the degree of PMC (i.e., the percentage change of the elasticity of substi-
tution) with regard to the frequency of patenting is 0￿135. A brief back-of-the-envelope calculation
shows that this value is economically quite signi�cant. The median elasticity in this sample of
vertically di�erentiated industries is 3￿73, whereas the standard deviation of the logarithm of the
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patenting frequency is 1￿87. Therefore, for the median industry, if the patenting frequency were
to increase by one standard deviation, the average industry elasticity would increase from from
3￿73 to 3￿73 ￿ ￿0￿135￿1￿87 = 4￿8. This, in turn, implies that the average markup would decrease
from 3￿73￿(3￿73￿1)￿1 = 37% to 4￿8￿(4￿8￿1)￿1 = 26%. A one-standard deviation increase in
patenting would thus reduce markups from 37% to 26%, or by nearly a third.
It could be the case that patenting is generally higher in larger economies and that markups
are generally lower in these larger economies because those markets are more crowded. We want to
be sure that the positive correlation between the degree of PMC and the frequency of entry is not
driven by this aggregate pattern but rather has industry-speci�c origins. Therefore, the estimation
reported in Column (2) includes country �xed e�ects that control for the across-country variation.
This approach does not alter the results, and the coe�cient is still estimated signi�cantly positive.
Also, within the countries, the frequency of patenting determines the degree of PMC across the
industries. Column (3) repeats the speci�cation of Column (2), but adding the outlier, which
leads to a much larger estimated elasticity.
Repeating the regression for the rest of the sample with the "horizontally di�erentiated"
goods, produces no signi�cant correlation between patenting and PMC. Column (4) reports the
estimates for the speci�cation with country �xed e�ects for the 35 sectors (210 country-industry
observations) that we cannot match with the vertically di�erentiated goods of Bils and Klenow
(2001). The coe�cient is an order of magnitude smaller in size than for the vertically di�erentiated
industries, and it is not signi�cant. It is noteworthy that industries classi�ed as "horizontally
di�erentiated" are, in terms of elasticities, about as di�erentiated as the "vertically di�erentiated"
ones. With the inclusion of the outlier, the average logarithm of the demand elasticity in the
former sample of vertical di�erentiated industries is 1￿524, while it is 1￿449 in the latter. This
result not only justi�es our labeling of "horizontally di�erentiated" goods but also ensures that
our estimation results are not driven by varying degrees of vertical di�erentiation across the good
classes or, similarly, by a di�erent mix of both classes under aggregation of the industries.
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Table 1 - Patenting and Product Market Competition in Vertically Differentiated Industries 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Sample:  Bills and Klenow Bills and Klenow Bills and Klenow not Vertically  Personal Transp.
Vertically Dif.  Vertically Dif.  Vertically Dif.  Dif. in Bills  (Cars, Trains, 
Excl. Cars-Italy  Excl. Cars-Italy  all sectors  and Klenow  Ships, Aircraft) 
Dependent Variable:  Ln of the Sector- and Country-Specific Demand Elasticity from Broda et al. (2006)
Ln of Patenting Per Sector   0.1345  0.1689  0.2632  0.0401  0.2977 
and Country  [0.0399]***  [0.0656]**  [0.1081]**  [0.0291]  [0.1515]* 
Country Dummies  y  y  y 
                 
Observations  47  47  48  210  24 
R-squared  0.16  0.19  0.26  0.1  0.12 
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
￿
Table 1
While we think that using the Bils and Klenow (2001) classi�cation of vertically di�erentiated
and other sectors is the most objectively consistent role we can follow, it is noteworthy that other
reasonable de�nitions of vertically di�erentiated goods lead to the same pattern. For example,
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot relating the logarithms of patenting and the elasticity of sub-
stitution for the four personal transportation equipment industries in our dataset: cars, ships,
railway, and aircraft. These industries are also arguably discrete-choice, vertically di�erentiated
industries. Also, within this sample, the relationship between PMC and patenting is negative
rather than positive. Due to the small sample size, however, (we have now four industries in six
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Patenting and PMC in Transportation Equipment Industries
These patterns in the data lead us to conclude that there is a robust positive correlation
between product innovation and PMC in vertically di�erentiated industries. We therefore believe
that the causal link running from innovation activity to larger product di�erentiation to PMC is
particularly strong in the case of vertically di�erentiated industries, which justi�es an e�ort to
develop a model of Schumpeterian growth with �rm entry, generating PMC endogenously. In the
following theory section, we set out to propose such a model.
3 Spatial Competition in Quality
In the following, we aim to analyze Schumpterian growth in a setup where more than one �rm
survives. To make this analysis possible, we must �rst develop a setup, where seemingly inferior,
low-quality �rms survive along with the technological leader. This task is not trivial, as Hotelling’s
classic ‘location’ paradigm, widely used to re�ect generic product characteristics, does not apply
to competition in quality. By its very de�nition, quality requires that individuals agree on the
ranking of varieties so that, in particular, their individually preferred "ideal variety" coincide.
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When it comes to vertical di�erentiation — or di�erentiation in quality — only the higher price
tag of the universally preferred higher-quality goods causes di�erent consumers to buy distinct
qualities.
Our approach is based on Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), who pioneered research on vertically
di�erentiated markets in which natural oligopolies prevail, i.e. markets that are dominated by
a limited number of "market leaders". The authors call this feature, characterizing vertically
di�erentiated markets, the ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. Its key element is that the marginal production
costs increase only moderately with quality, which enables high-quality �rms to out-price low-
quality competitors.13 Whenever this condition is violated, heterogeneous consumers may di�er
in their individual ranking of variety-price pairs, and Shaked and Sutton (1983) observe that the
competition in quality is "reminiscent of the ‘location’ paradigm" by Hotelling. The authors do
not analyze this case, which would, given their assumption of costless market entry, imply entry
of unaccountably many �rms and competitive pricing along a dense set of qualities.
In the present section, we analyze the case where the marginal cost of production does increase
su�ciently in quality, thus violating the ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, while explicitly modeling the �rms’
quality choice under the standard assumption of costly market entry. We adopt a setup in the
spirit of Shaked and Sutton, where consumers prefer quality at a linear rate.14 We depart from
their setup, however, by assuming that the price of a good increases steeply with the good’s
quality, so that lower-valuation consumers in equilibrium prefer to buy goods other than the one
of the current technological leader.
Figure 3 depicts the resulting equilibrium market structure of our approach: higher-valuation
consumers tend to buy from high-quality producers. Each �rm has two direct competitors (one
for the maximum-quality producer) and sells to a range of consumers who, on the one hand, do
value quality enough to buy from the �rm in question rather than the direct lower competitor
but, on the other hand, do not value quality enough to buy from the higher-quality competitor.
13See also Shaked and Sutton 1984, Lahmandi-Ayed 2000 and 2004, and Sutton 2007, 2007a.
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Figure 3: Segmentation of the consumer/valuation space by quality levels.
In the next steps, we formalize this framework and analyze the static determinants of prices
and pro�ts for a given quality spacing.
3.1 General Setup
There are one homogeneous good ￿ and a continuum of di�erentiated goods of total mass one ￿￿
(￿ � [0￿1]). Each of the di�erentiated goods comes in a set of di�erent quality levels {￿￿￿}￿￿￿￿ .
3.1.1 Preferences
From each of the di�erentiated goods ￿￿, consumers consume either one unit or none at all. When
consuming the amount ￿ of good ￿ and the vector of qualities q = {￿￿}￿￿[0￿1] of the ￿￿-goods, an
individual derives utility






The higher the parameter ￿, the higher is the individual’s desire to consume quality. We will,
therefore, in the following call ￿ the valuation of quality or simply ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.
Our formulation of preferences slightly modi�es the approach from Mussa and Rosen (1978)
to a multitude of di�erentiated goods; it is also close to the standard formulation of Shaked
and Sutton (1982), who assume a multiplicative structure between the homogeneous and the
di�erentiated good.
We normalize the price of the homogeneous good ￿ to unity and write ￿￿(￿￿) for the price
of quality ￿￿. The mass of individuals totals ￿. These individuals value the di�erentiated good
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di�erently, i.e., with di�erent parameters ￿. We de�ne the resulting cumulative density function
of valuations as
￿(￿) : [￿min￿￿max] � [0￿1] (2)
where 0 � ￿min ￿ ￿max ￿ �.
3.1.2 Production
The ￿-type good is produced competitively with constant returns to scale and labor as the only
factor. Production technologies of the ￿-type goods exhibit increasing returns to scale and depend
on the quality level produced. In the following, we consider a representative ￿-industry and drop
the index ￿. Firms that enter the ￿-market to produce the quality ￿ � (0￿�) must acquire a
blueprint at the �xed cost of
￿ (￿￿ ¯ ￿) = ￿￿ (￿￿¯ ￿) ¯ ￿￿ (3)
e�ective labor units, where ¯ ￿ is the maximum quality of the incumbent �rms. The function ￿(￿)
is di�erentiable and increasing, while ￿ (￿￿¯ ￿) ¯ ￿￿ is (weakly) decreasing in ¯ ￿. We thus assume that
blueprints of higher qualities are always more expensive, but invention of a given quality is less
expensive the more advanced the existing quality frontier.
A �rm, having acquired a blueprint for quality ￿, can produce at the constant marginal cost
of
￿(￿) = ￿￿￿ (4)
labor units. The parameters ￿￿￿ ￿ 0 govern the production cost. We assume that both, the �xed
cost of entry, as well as, the marginal cost are increasing and convex in quality (￿ ￿ 1).
We characterize the equilibrium in which �rms enter production at the optimal quality level
and subsequently engage in monopolistic pricing. The equilibrium is solved through backward
induction, i.e., we �rst determine the prices at given quality levels and subsequently analyze entry
decisions.
3.2 Optimal Pricing
We begin by characterizing the general pricing solution for an arbitrary distribution of a countable
set of qualities. For notational simplicity, we set ￿￿ = ￿(￿￿) and ￿￿ = ￿(￿￿), where ￿￿ is the quality
level produced by �rm ￿. We index �rms by ￿ � N0 = {0￿�1￿�2￿￿￿￿} and order �rms by their
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quality level so that �rm 0 produces the highest quality level ￿0, and all further quality levels
satisfy ￿￿�1 ￿ ￿￿.15
Firms compete in prices, i.e., each �rm sets the price of its quality to maximize its operating
pro�ts, while taking total demand and the other �rms’ prices as given. Under preferences (1), a
consumer with valuation ￿ is indi�erent between two goods ￿￿ and ￿￿+1 if and only if their prices
￿￿ and ￿￿+1 are such that ￿￿￿+1 � ￿￿+1 = ￿￿￿ � ￿￿. Thus, given ￿(￿) from (2) and given the






￿max if ￿ = 0
￿￿ � ￿￿�1
￿￿ � ￿￿�1
if ￿ ￿ 0
￿min if ￿ = ￿min � 1
(5)
The �rms’ market shares are thus [￿￿￿￿￿+1], and the market is partitioned as shown in Figure 3.
Because each consumer with valuation ￿ � [￿￿￿￿￿+1] demands one unit of the variety produced




(￿￿ � ￿￿)[￿(￿￿+1) � ￿(￿￿)]￿ ￿￿￿￿ (5) (6)
The optimality condition of this problem is









where the expressions (5) apply. At ￿min, ￿max, the constant limits of the distribution, the
derivatives in (7) are set to zero (￿0(￿min) = ￿0(￿max) = 0). Firm ￿’s pro�ts are zero at ￿￿ = ￿￿
and at
¯ ￿￿ =
(￿￿ � ￿￿�1)￿￿+1 + (￿￿+1 � ￿￿)￿￿�1
￿￿+1 � ￿￿�1
because the latter price implies ￿￿+1 = ￿￿ and thus zero market share for the ￿￿￿ �rm. Finally,
as17
¯ ￿ =
(￿￿ � ￿￿�1)￿￿+1 + (￿￿+1 � ￿￿)￿￿�1
￿￿+1 � ￿￿�1
�
(￿￿ � ￿￿�1)￿￿+1 + (￿￿+1 � ￿￿)￿￿�1
￿￿+1 � ￿￿�1
￿ ￿￿
15Notice that we implicitly assume the set of �rms is countable. By making this assumption, we already anticipate
that in the equilibrium of the later entry game, �rms need to recoup their setup cost with monopoly rents. Under
Bertrand competition and positive setup cost, this assumption implies that �rms must be located at positive distance
to each other, and the number of �rms is necessarily countable.
16We rule out undercutting, where �rm ￿ sets its quality-adjusted price to take the market share of a directly
neighboring �rm and compete with second-next �rms.
17The last inequality holds by convexity of ￿(￿).
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and pro�ts are positive for ￿￿ � [￿￿￿ ¯ ￿], there is an interior solution to the pro�t maximization
problem, which necessarily satis�es (7). Generic pro�ts are










With this characterization of prices and operating pro�ts, some regularities of equilibrium prices
and pro�ts emerge.
Lemma 1 ￿￿￿ {￿￿}￿�0￿ {￿￿}￿�0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ {￿￿}￿�0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ {￿￿}￿�0￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿￿ ￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿0 = ￿￿�1￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿




￿ = ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿￿ �￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿ ￿00





￿ = ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿ �￿￿
Proof. ￿￿￿ •￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The �rst part of the Lemma states that, if quality levels, marginal production costs and
valuations increase at the right proportions (according to (3) and (4)), then equilibrium prices
and pro�ts are a constant proportion of the marginal production costs. Part (ii) of the Lemma
states that if marginal production costs and valuations increase proportionally while quality levels
are constant, then prices and pro�ts are a constant proportion of the marginal production costs.
These regularities will lead us to a particularly nice pattern of the �rms’ quality choice —
namely proportional spacing. We turn to this feature next.
4 Endogenous Spacing Under Free Entry
This section shows that in a dynamic version of the general setup described above, free entry
supports equilibria with equal relative spacing of �rms, endogenously generating quality levels
that satisfy
￿￿￿�1 = ￿￿ � ￿￿ (9)
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We introduce a dynamic dimension to our model by assuming that time is continuous and that
valuations grow at the constant rate ￿. The rate ￿ is for now given exogenously and is endogenized
in Section 5 below. Indexing each valuation parameter with time subscripts, we can write ￿￿ =
￿￿￿￿￿. Consequently, the distribution ￿ is time dependent and satis�es
￿￿(￿) = ￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿) (10)
where ￿￿ is the distribution at the initial date ￿ = 0.
Our analysis aims at a stationary equilibrium in which each �rm enters the industry as the
technological leader and successively transits through the product cycle as it becomes superseded
by further innovators. The gain of such a dynamic entry game is that we only need to analyze
the entry problem of one �rm at a time. In particular, we avoid the problems that arise in a
simultaneous entry game, such as in Vogel (2008).18
In a dynamic game of this type, the pro�ts of a �rm producing ￿￿ evolve as depicted by the
bold line segments in Figure 4. Each continuous section represents the pro�ts when no innovation
occurs. Innovations occur at regular intervals (depicted by ￿￿
1, ￿￿
2￿￿￿). At these moments, the �rm’s
pro�t drops by a discrete amount, because the new competitor reduces the incumbents’ sales and
markups.
The dashed line illustrates the general trend. Two opposing forces are at work that explain
why this trend may be �rst increasing and then decreasing over time. First, for a given set of
�rms, the pro�t �ow for top-quality �rms is increasing as consumer valuations increase over time,
driving up market shares and markups. Second, the growing range of consumer valuations also
implies that the density of consumer valuations constantly thins out. In particular, �rms converge
at the limit to serving a �xed interval of valuations, while the density of valuation over this range
constantly thins out. Therefore, the pro�t �ow drops to zero at the limit.
18In fact, the resulting complications would be tremendous in our setup, because the clear ranking of the quality
line prevents us from using the symmetry properties that arise in models based on Hotelling (1929), where one can
consider economies formed like a circle street or the beach surrounding an island. In a quality setup, however, any
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Figure 4: Pro�t Flow over the Life Cycle of the Firm Entering at ￿￿
0
In the entry equilibrium depicted in Figure 4, entry is such that any innovating �rm imme-
diately starts producing once it enters the market. If entry is su�ciently cheap, the zero pro�t
condition may also force �rms to enter the industry pre-emptively: at the moment of entry ￿￿
0,
the good produced by the technological leader is of such a high quality that there would be no
demand for the �rm’s product even if it were sold at marginal costs.
The resulting product life cycle with pre-emptive entry is depicted in Figure 5. In this equilib-
rium, valuations only catch up after some time and the associated income and valuation growth.
In Figure 5, we depict an economy where in equilibrium, consumers’ willingness to pay for quality
￿￿￿￿￿￿ is such that new �rms only sell after two further entries. In such an equilibrium, at the
moment when the maximum valuation ￿￿￿￿(￿)is just high enough so that this consumer buys
from the �rm that entered at ￿￿
0, �rm 0 sells at marginal costs (because it sells to a set of 0 con-
sumers so that demand is in�nitely elastic). Thereafter, the pro�t �ow of �rm 0 increases steeply
with time: not only does the set of consumers it serves grow rapidly as valuations catch up, but
also, as it sells to a growing range of consumers, its demand becomes less elastic and, thus, its
markup increases steadily. In the limit, the �rm approaches a constant markup. Because the �rm
converges at the limit to serving a �xed interval of valuations, while the density of valuation over
this range constantly thins out, later in the product life cycle the pro�t �ow drops and asymptotes
to 0.
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Figure 5: Pro�t Flow of the Firm Entering at ￿￿
0 under Pre-Emptive Entry
In the entry game, �rms decide not only which quality to aim for but also when to enter the
industry. We assume that at each point in time, there is a mass of potential entrants who could
pay a �xed cost ￿ (￿) to receive a perpetual monopoly to produce the good of quality level ￿.
With this setup, the potential entrants start innovating as soon as innovation generates a pro�t
�ow with a net present value as least as big as the innovation cost.
Initially, the set of active �rms is {0￿�1￿�2￿￿￿￿}. Firms are ordered according to ascending
qualities, so that a higher �rm index corresponds to a higher quality. These initially active �rms
produce qualities {￿￿}￿￿0, which satisfy (9). As demand grows for goods at the top end of the
quality spectrum, new �rms gradually establish at the upper end of the quality spectrum.
We assume that a plant established at quality level ￿￿ automatically holds the blueprints for
all qualities between ￿￿￿1 and ￿￿, where ￿￿￿1 is the next lower quality level. This assumption
restricts entry of additional �rms to quality levels above the pre-existing ones (￿￿+1 � ￿￿).
Now, for ￿ � 1, let ￿￿ denote the entry date of the ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ �rm (implying 0 � ￿1 �
￿2 � ￿￿), and further let ￿￿ stand for its quality level (￿0 � ￿1 � ￿2 � ￿￿). It will prove convenient
to express the quality choice of the ￿￿￿ entrant relative to the highest quality of all incumbents
(￿￿￿1) as
￿￿ = ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ � 1￿
At time ￿ � [￿￿+￿￿￿￿+￿+1) the set of quality levels supplied to the market is {￿￿}￿￿￿+￿. Current
prices are determined implicitly by (7) and depend on all currently produced quality levels as well
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as on all current valuations ￿￿ = ￿￿￿￿. Consequently, at time ￿ � [￿￿+￿￿￿￿+￿+1), the operating
pro�ts (8) of the ￿￿￿ additional �rm are a function of qualities {￿￿}￿￿￿+￿ and time ￿. We
can express this time dependence as dependence on the factor ￿￿￿, which multiplies all valuation










we have ￿￿+￿ = �￿￿￿￿￿ so that at time ￿￿, the present value of the �ow of operating pro�ts for











The parameter ￿ is the constant rate at which �rms discount future pro�ts.
We are now ready to formulate the entry decision of �rms. The ￿￿￿ �rm chooses its entry
date (￿￿) and its location on the quality line (￿￿). With the second choice, it maximizes the
present value of pro�ts at time ￿￿ (12) net of costs (3). Given the spacing ￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿,














￿￿￿￿ ˜ �￿￿￿˜ ￿�0￿￿￿1￿0￿ ˆ ￿￿+￿￿ˆ ￿￿+￿￿1￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ˆ ￿￿+1￿ ˜ ￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿
¶
￿￿ � ￿(˜ ￿￿�0￿￿￿1￿0)
¾
(13)
Here, ˜ �￿￿￿ stands, similar to (11), for the product of the ￿ future optimal relative spacing para-





ˆ ￿￿+￿￿1￿ˆ ￿￿+￿￿2￿￿￿￿˜ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿
¢
￿
Note that all future location choices ˆ ￿￿+￿ (and ˜ �￿￿￿) as well as future entry dates ￿￿+￿ are
functions of the ￿￿￿ �rm’s choice. For expositional purposes, however, the arguments ˆ ￿￿+￿(˜ ￿),
˜ �￿￿￿(˜ ￿), ￿￿+￿(˜ ￿) are suppressed in (13) and further down. The ￿￿￿ �rm’s entry date is determined














￿￿￿￿ ˜ �￿￿￿˜ ￿�￿
0￿￿￿1￿0￿ ˆ ￿￿+￿￿ ˆ ￿￿+￿￿1￿￿￿￿













￿ denotes the equilibrium locations
￿￿
1 = ˆ ￿1 (￿) and ￿￿












Optimal quality choices (13) and the free entry conditions (14) of all entrants (￿ � 1) determine
the equilibrium of the entry game. The �rst important result of this section concerns the solution
of the system (13) - (14) and is formulated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ¯ ￿ ￿ 1
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ = ¯ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿ � Z￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿• ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
� = (￿ � 1)￿￿1 ln(¯ ￿)￿ (16)
Proof. See Appendix.
For the parameters (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿), we label the corresponding equilibrium the Equal Relative
Spacing Equilibrium (ERSE). Notice that the proposition establishes existence of the ERSE but
is silent about its uniqueness. We therefore restrict all further considerations to the one ERSE
(out of possibly many) with the minimal spacing ¯ ￿. Now, (as argued in the proof of Proposition
1), under a preexisting spacing parameter equal to one (￿ = 1), the optimal spacing of the �rst
entrant ￿￿(￿) from (15) satis�es ￿￿(￿) ￿ ￿ for all ￿ � (1￿ ¯ ￿). Consequently, we conclude that at
the minimal symmetric ¯ ￿, characterized by ￿￿(¯ ￿) = ¯ ￿
￿￿￿(￿)
￿￿
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
￿=¯ ￿
￿ 1￿ (17)
holds. For this ERSE with the smallest ￿, we can show the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 ￿￿￿ ¯ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ¯ ￿ •￿￿￿￿•￿ ￿￿ ￿￿(￿￿) ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿• ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ¯ ￿(￿￿(￿￿))￿
￿￿￿￿ ¯ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿•￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿￿) � ￿ · (￿￿￿￿￿)￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿
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Proof. ￿￿￿ Operating pro�ts ￿ are linear in ￿; setup costs ￿ are linear in ￿. Thus, when
replacing ￿0 = ￿￿￿, population ￿ factors out of the slanted brackets in (13) and the square brackets
in (14). Consequently, the solution to problem (13) - (15) and thus ¯ ￿ depends on ￿0 = ￿￿￿
only. Similarly, operating pro�ts are, by Lemma 2 (ii), linear in ￿ under the transformation
￿0(￿) = ￿(￿)￿￿ (or ￿0 = ￿�ln(￿1￿￿)). Hence, replacing ￿0 = ￿￿￿ in (13) and (14), ¯ ￿ depends on ￿0
only.
￿￿￿￿ Net present pro�ts (12) are constant under the time transformation ￿ � ￿￿, given that
locations are constant and �rm entry dates transform by ￿￿ � ￿￿￿. Under this condition, the
�rm entry remains unchanged. By (13), �rm entries are transformed accordingly. Finally, the
time transformation is equivalent to (￿￿￿￿￿) � ￿ · (￿￿￿￿￿).
Technically, the Lemma shows that we can choose the notation ¯ ￿(￿) to re�ect the functional
dependence of ¯ ￿ on all three parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿. Economically, it says that the density of
quality supply (and of competition) is equally a�ected by a doubling of the market size or the
marginal costs or by a reduction of setup cost by half.
It would be premature, however, to infer welfare consequences based on the parameter ¯ ￿ (and
its impact on markups) alone, conjecturing, e.g., that an equal increase of the setup costs ￿ and
the operating costs ￿ leaves the economy unchanged. In fact it does not. Such a change in
technology actually postpones innovation (re�ected in the time transformation in the Lemma’s
proof) so that more time elapses until a given quality is on the market. This delay means that
individuals purchase lower qualities because each quality is more expensive, and fewer high-quality
goods are available on the market. Both e�ects have a negative impact on consumer surplus. It
is straight forward, however, to show that an increase in setup cost that is entirely o�set by an
increase in the size of the workforce ￿, preserving not only the relative spacing ¯ ￿ but also the
timing of innovations, and thus leaving the quality spectrum at each point in time unchanged.19
This section has derived a novel result about the regularity of spacing (Proposition 1) and
the relative impact of the model’s key parameters (Lemma 2). These �ndings hold in a relatively
general setup, which includes, in particular, a non-degenerate distribution of valuations (2). This
generality, however, comes at a price. In particular, we were unable to show uniqueness of
19It is interesting to note that our model exhibits a monopoly distortion that is new to the endogenous growth
literature: positive markups lead consumers to choose a quality that di�ers from the socially optimal one. In
equilibrium, each consumer compares the increase in the goods’ quality to the increase in the good’s price. Because
markups are generally increasing along the quality dimension, the increase in price from one good to the other is
higher than the cost increase. Consumers, therefore, tend to choose too low a quality.
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equilibria — neither of the entry game nor, in fact, of the pricing game (determined by (7)).
We solved the �rst of these uniqueness problems by restricting our analysis to the equilibrium
with the highest density of quality and simply ignored the second.20 In the important case of a
uniform distribution of valuations, also the second of the ambiguities luckily vanishes. We next
turn to this case.
4.1 Uniform Distribution
We analyze the special case when valuations are distributed uniformly as
￿￿(￿) = ￿([0￿￿max])￿ (18)
In this case, which also appears in Auer and Chaney (2007), the optimality conditions (7) give
rise to the system
￿￿ =
�
� � � �
� � � �
1
2












if ￿ ￿ 0
(19)
which implies that equilibrium prices are determined as follows.













2(￿ + 1) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ (21)
￿ = ￿ + 1 +
p

















Proposition 2 not only provides a closed-form solution but, in addition, establishes uniqueness
of the pricing equilibrium. Notice �nally that, while the term ￿ from (20) may be negative,
markups are always positive.21
20In fact, it is easy to remedy this problem by either assuming that economic agents correctly anticipate one
stable pricing equilibrium or by introducing expectations, of pro�ts in particular, when realizations of equilibria are
identically and independently distributed over time.
21Inequalities 2(￿ + 1) ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿
1￿￿ and ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 1 hold (are violated) for ￿ ￿ 1 (￿ ￿ ￿) and ￿ = ￿
￿ if and only
if ￿ solves ￿
￿ +￿
1￿￿ = 2(￿ +1). Thus, ￿ is negative i� ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 1. Now, distinguish two cases. First, if ￿ ￿ 0 holds,
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Proposition 2 also allows us to make an intuitive and simple statement regarding the e�ect of
entry on the markups of existing �rms.
Lemma 3 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿1 = ￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Proof. Denote the parameter from (23) before (after) entry of the additional �rm with ￿
( ˜ ￿) and notice that by (4), ￿ ￿ ˜ ￿ holds. Consider now the case where ˜ ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1. In this
case, the additional �rm does not produce, and the pricing of producing �rms does not change.
Consequently, markups stay constant. Consider next ˜ ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1. Denoting the price of �rm ￿










There are now two cases to distinguish. First, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1, implying ￿ ￿ 1. In this case, ￿￿￿˜ ￿￿ ￿ 1
holds by ￿ ￿ ˜ ￿. Second, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1, implying ￿ ￿ 0. In that case, we write with (23)
￿￿ ￿ ˜ ￿￿
￿￿ (￿￿￿￿)
























The expression on the right is positive, proving ￿￿￿˜ ￿￿ ￿ 1 in the second case, too.
The Lemma distinguishes two cases. First, the additional �rm engages in production and
impacts the whole market by depressing markups. Second, it does not pay for the additional �rm
to produce and sell its goods, and consequently leaves the market una�ected. As this second case
is a possibility, the entry of additional �rms decreases the markup of any preexisting �rm only
weakly.
Our next aim is to conduct comparative statics with regard to the model’s parameters. As a
preparatory step, we write for the relative markup of the highest quality �rm


















we have ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿￿￿




+ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ for all ￿ ￿ 0. Second, if ￿ ￿ 0, we verify ￿ ￿ 1, so




+ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ holds again for all
￿ ￿ 0 by ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 1. It is thus su�cient to show ￿+￿ ￿ 1. By (23), this condition is satis�ed as long as ￿max￿0￿￿0
is large enough. Obviously, it may happen that ￿max￿0￿￿0 is very small. In that case, however, top-quality �rms do
not sell at all, and we can renumber �rms, indexing the highest quality �rm with ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ with ￿ = 0. This
renumbering increases ￿ up to the point where ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 holds.
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With the explicit formula for the prices (20), the operating pro�ts from (8) are thus
￿￿ =
�
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
μ






















if ￿ ￿ 0
(24)
Observe with (21) and (23) that the limit
lim
￿￿1











is �nite. Thus, in the case of equal relative spacing, the operating pro�ts are, by (21) - (23) and
the limit above, continuously di�erentiable for all ￿ ￿ 1 and satisfy, moreover
￿￿ ￿ 0 (￿ ￿ 1)￿
Moreover, and very importantly, we can sign the slope of the ERSE’s location, i.e., the function
¯ ￿(￿).
Proposition 3 ￿￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ¯ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ¯ ￿(￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ [￿￿ ¯ ￿] ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ [0￿￿0]￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ¯ ￿(￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿
Proof. See Appendix.
In combination with the proof of the existence of an equilibrium (see Proposition 1), Propo-
sition 3 represents the main result of our analysis. It establishes the comparative statics of the
equilibrium degree of spacing with regard to the entry cost.22
This proposition shows that higher setup costs increase the relative spacing between quality
levels. Intuitively, �rms must be compensated for increases in setup costs by increased pro�ts.
The latter pro�t increases are brought about by larger market shares and by higher markups and,
ultimately, by a wider spacing parameter ¯ ￿. Larger markets induce more frequent �rm entry and
a higher density of quality supply, because higher sales and pro�ts allow a faster recovery of setup
costs. Markups, in turn, are decreasing in the density of supply and are thus decreasing in the
market size.
22The condition on the interest rate ￿ is a technical restriction without an economic interpretation.
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In our modeling strategy, the direction of technological advance follows from �rms’ desire to
di�erentiate their products from the competition. This causality contrasts with the motivation
for research in most existing Schumpeterian growth models, where the motive for innovation is to
undercut the competition in e�ective per-unit costs. This principal di�erence in the motivation
of �rms to conduct costly R&D is associated with the key implications that the degree of product
market competition (PMC) depends positively on the rate of entry, as only frequent entry can
give rise to dense competition in the quality space, and thus, to a high degree of PMC. In our
setup, the degree of product market competition (PMC) and the frequency of innovation are thus
increasing, whereas this relation is reversed in models a là Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Together with Lemma 2, Proposition 3 also determines the impact of market size (￿) and
marginal production costs (￿) on the spacing ¯ ￿ of the ERSE. In particular, increases in ￿ and
￿ have a similar e�ect on ¯ ￿ as reductions in setup costs — all of them decreasing the equilibrium
spacing ¯ ￿. Clearly, a larger market induces, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, higher pro�ts and allows �rms to
generate more pro�ts. At constant setup costs, larger markets therefore experience more frequent
entry of �rms at closer distances: the competitive pressure among �rms rises.
Surprisingly, productivity growth at the margin (a decrease in marginal production costs ￿)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ relative spacing and ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ the toughness of competition. This adverse e�ect of mar-
ginal productivity growth on competitive pressure may appear somewhat puzzling. To understand
the forces operating to this e�ect, observe that the preference speci�cation generates, just as or-
dinary CES preferences, relative �rm markups ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 that are independent of costs (see prices
(20)). Put di�erently, at a given relative spacing, operating pro�ts constitute a constant share of
revenues. Hence, when quality levels are constant, an increase in marginal productivity (a drop in
marginal costs) tends to curb revenues and thereby depresses operating pro�ts.23 As �rms must
cover their setup costs, however, the productivity gains that curb pro�ts per consumer must come
about with increases in market share, ￿￿￿￿, with a wider equilibrium spacing. This widening of
relative spacing does, at the same time, increase relative markups. Hence, competitive pressure
decreases as marginal productivity grows.
Notice that for this e�ect to play a crucial role requires the assumption that demand does
not react along an intensive margin. In particular, consumers do not react to price changes by
consuming more or less but by switching to other �rms.




Up to this point, we have treated the growth of valuations (10) and interest rates as exogenous
and have neglected, moreover, resource constraints. In this section, we repair these shortcomings.
In particular, we show that the partial equilibrium model above is compatible with individual
optimization under balanced growth. In doing so, we postulate spillover e�ects of innovation and
solve for endogenous growth rates.
The balanced growth path, if it exists, is characterized by a constant growth rate of income,
￿, as well as a constant rate of innovation. Under the simplifying assumption ￿(￿) = 1 regarding
setup costs from (3), constant expenditure on innovation implies that income grows at the same
pace as the top quality, ￿max, raised to the power of ￿. Thus, ￿max grows at the rate ￿￿￿. Constant
innovation also implies that, within each industry, the top quality increases by the factor ¯ ￿ each
period of length � (compare (16)) — or ￿�￿￿￿ = ¯ ￿ so that ￿￿￿ = ￿￿(￿￿1). This identity determines
the relation between the growth rate of income, ￿, and that of valuations, ￿.
Concerning the growth of valuations (10), we simply assume that the individual valuation ￿ is
proportional to a power of income, ￿. By the above identity relating growth rates, this assumption
leads to
￿ = ￿(1￿1￿￿)￿ (25)
Together with the utility (1) this speci�cation implies that income and quality are complementary.
The higher a consumer’s income, the higher is ￿ and thus her willingness to pay for quality.
Our speci�c functional form (25) substantially simpli�es the closing of the model, but at the
cost of departing from the standard theory. More precisely, the literature following Shaked and
Sutton (1982) postulates that ￿ is a function of residual income (income minus the expenditure
on the di�erentiated good). While this standard approach can be read as a shortcut for the
consumption level of the homogeneous numeraire, no such interpretation is available for our
speci�cation above.24 Nevertheless, we stress that any previous result is independent of our
peculiar assumption, and only the endogeneity of interest and growth rates rely on it.
To identify a path of balanced growth, we return to the notation of many identical industries,
indexed by ￿ ￿ [0￿1]. Within industry ￿, a set of qualities ￿￿￿ is produced. The set ￿￿￿ expands
over time and is therefore indexed by ￿.
24In fact, we leave the ground of classical consumer theory here.
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Technology Spillovers. The structure of the model implies that, in addition to endoge-
nous innovation through market entry, more general e�ciency gains must be generated in order
to sustain positive growth. More precisely, as an increasing number of high-quality goods are
produced at higher unit labor requirements, the e�ective labor supply must increase at a cor-
responding rate. We therefore de�ne a time-dependent parameter of labor productivity by ￿￿,
which multiplies individual labor endowments. Further, we postulate that ￿￿ depends positively















where � is the density or rate at which the ￿ are invented.
Constant innovation activity requires that the average rate of innovation be constant over
time. Thus, we assume that in any two time intervals of equal length, the same number of
additional qualities are invented. Consequently, the rate at which qualities appear on the time-
line is constant: each ￿￿, there are �￿1￿￿ qualities invented (� from (16)), and the density � of
qualities is �￿1.
As argued above, the growth rate of the maximal ￿￿ equals ￿￿￿ or ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1). Together, this














Finally, as income is proportional to labor productivity, ￿ = � ￿￿￿ must hold so that balanced






In sum, when production costs, preferences and spillover e�ects are governed by ￿ in the
way speci�ed by (1), (3), (4), (25) and (26), the model may generate balanced growth. An
additional condition, however, is that individuals save at constant rates. We next propose a setup
of individual optimization that generates constant savings rates.
Consumer Optimization. Nesting the paper’s model in a standard dynamic setting with
in�nitely lived consumers and dynamic optimization is tricky for the following reason. The some-
what peculiar instantaneous utility (1) implies that the composite of di�erentiated goods is a
3030 31
non-linear function of expenditure. More precisely, the relative price between the quality aggre-
gate and the homogeneous good is not constant in expenditure. A consumer reacts to these price
e�ects when trading o� a marginal increase of consumption today against consumption tomorrow.
This reaction distorts the standard intertemporal optimality conditions. Worse yet, the price ef-
fect of a marginal quality upgrading of the bundle (1) is di�erent for rich and for poor consumers,
due to the varying markups from (20). We cannot hope to easily bring the resulting heterogeneous
savings rates to a constant aggregate one while preserving the expenditure patterns that generate
valuations (10) and (18).
To resolve these di�culties, we turn to a setting of overlapping generations, assuming that
at each in�nitesimal time interval ￿￿, the constant mass ￿￿￿ · ￿￿ of individuals is born, which
constitutes a fraction of a continuum of overlapping generations. Individuals live for ￿ time units
so that, at each point in time, ￿ individuals populate the economy. An individual born at ￿ is
endowed with ￿￿￿ labor units, where ￿￿￿ is distributed as
￿
(￿￿1)￿￿
￿￿ � ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) (27)
(￿ from (2)). Individuals save their labor income to consume at the end of their lifes. To avoid
the di�culties of intertemporal expenditure allocation sketched above, the �nal consumption
period has length zero. Lifetime wealth ￿ is proportional to labor productivity ￿￿￿. With the
adequate choice of the constant in (27), this implies that ￿ = ￿(￿￿1)￿￿, and hence valuations ￿
are distributed according to (2).25
Aggregate Savings. Consider the cohort born at ￿0, which is endowed with labor ￿￿￿. At
time ￿ � (￿0￿￿0 + ￿) the cohort earns ￿￿￿￿￿ from labor income, which it saves. Consequently,











Hence, the wealth of the oldest living cohort, which equals aggregate consumption ￿￿, is














25The choice of the constant is not essential, as, by (10), a change in the constant amounts to a re-normalization
of time.
3132 33
Investment. Total investment goes to the invention of blueprints. Because each � time units
the qualities of all industries are upgraded exactly once (see (16)), �￿1·￿￿ new blueprints appear
in each in�nitesimal time interval ￿￿, generating the �ow of investment costs
￿￿￿ = �￿1￿￿￿
￿￿ (30)
(Recall that ￿(￿) � 1.)
Resource Constraint. We write ￿￿ for the value of the total output produced at time ￿.
As every dollar produced ultimately ends up in the pockets of individuals, and individual income
consists of returns to savings plus labor income, we have
￿￿ = ￿￿￿ + ￿￿￿ (31)
In the �rms’ books, the total value of output appears as the wage bill plus the �ow of operating
pro�ts. Summing the value of all �rms implies
￿￿ = ￿￿￿ + ￿￿ (32)




￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿.26 With these equations, we are ready to pin down the
evolution of the economy and the interest rate.
Market Clearing. Capital market clearing requires that total investment equals output
minus consumption expenditure (￿￿�￿￿ = ￿￿￿). Using expression (31) and collecting ￿￿ and ￿￿












Observing that the expression ((￿￿ � 1)￿￿ � 1)￿￿ =
P￿
￿=2 ￿!￿￿ is increasing in ￿, we know that
condition (33) uniquely determines the di�erence between interest rate and growth rate, ￿ � ￿.
Thus, (33) pins down expenditure on consumption (28) and total wealth (29).
To close the model, we �nally combine (31) and (32) to observe that at each point in time,










26We avoid the Greek ￿ to avoid confusing total instantaneous pro�ts with the discounted �ow of pro�ts.
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Because ￿ = ￿￿￿(￿￿1), we can apply Lemma 2 (ii) to the transformation (￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿).
Hence, this transformation leaves the relative spacing ￿ unchanged, which implies that per capita
pro�ts, on the right of (34), remain constant. Further, the expression on the left is increasing in
￿, thus determining the unique equilibrium interest rate ￿￿. Finally, (33) determines the growth
rate of the economy, ￿, and thus the growth rate of valuations is ￿ = ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿.
In summary, this last part of the analysis has demonstrated that long-run economic growth can
arise from entrants’ desire to di�erentiate their output in the quality space if, on the one hand,
increasingly wealthy consumers are willing to pay for higher quality and, on the other hand,
private �rms’ innovation generates income growth by enlarging the set of technologies available.
In this way, the �rms’ research e�orts generate exactly the income growth that is needed to spur
demand for ever higher-quality goods.
6 Conclusion
The “Schumpeterian” class of endogenous growth models has focused almost exclusively on in-
dustries where the technological leader takes over the entire market.27 A major shortcoming of
this modeling strategy is that only one �rm is active at a time, so that the degree of product
market competition has to be introduced via exogenous parameters. In particular, the toughness
of product market competition does not arise from �rms’ decisions to di�erentiate their products
from those of their competitors.
In this paper, we address this shortcoming by developing a new model suitable for analyzing
the competition, innovation, and growth nexus in vertically di�erentiated markets featuring a
large number of �rms and an endogenous degree of product di�erentiation. We focus on one-
time innovation decisions and examine how the demand parameters themselves are shaped by the
degree to which innovators distinguish their products from existing ones.
Our model helps to understand how �rm pro�ts, �rm innovation, and the toughness of compe-
tition emerge endogenously. This understanding enables us to analyze how market characteristics
in�uence product market competition and how, in turn, the toughness of competition a�ects
investments in innovation and economic growth.
27Aghion et al. (1997) and Aghion et al. (2005) analyze an economy with two �rms in a setup where demand
parameters are �xed, but �rms can innovate repeatedly to "escape" their competition.
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Our work points out that creative destruction may work through pro-competitive e�ects rather
than through the "business stealing" mechanism found in the existing literature. In our setup,
business stealing by new entrants is limited in the sense that innovators only sell to a set of
consumers whose demand was relatively poorly matched by the supply of pre-existing �rms.
Consequently, it is not warranted that innovation occurs too often in the decentralized economy.
On the contrary, new entrants make the set of available goods more di�erentiated, which is shown
to exert a pro-competitive e�ect on ￿￿￿ �rms, leading to a reduction of �rm markups by all �rms.
This reduction is strongest for those �rms closest to the technological frontier.
A Appendix
Proof: Lemma 1. (i) Under ￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿, ￿0 = ￿￿�1￿ and ￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿￿, the cuto�s from (5) become
￿0
￿ = ￿￿�1￿￿ and ￿0
￿+1 = ￿￿�1￿￿+1￿
Now, based on (2), the transformation ￿0 = ￿￿�1￿ induces a new cdf ˜ ￿ with
˜ ￿(￿0) = ￿(￿)￿ (35)
With this identity and ￿0 = ￿￿�1￿, compute
˜ ￿0(￿0) = lim
￿�0




￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿1�￿￿)
￿
= ￿1�￿￿0(￿)












































￿ = ￿�1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿0
￿+1￿￿￿0
￿ = ￿�1￿￿￿+1￿￿￿￿ has been used. This shows that
￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿￿ solves the transformed pricing system. By (4), (8) and (35) ￿0
￿ = ￿￿￿￿ follows,
completing the proof of (i).
(ii) Under ￿00
￿ = ￿￿, ￿00 = ￿￿ and ￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿ the cuto�s from (5) become
￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿ and ￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿￿
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As in (i), the transformation ￿00 = ￿￿ induces a new cdf ˆ ￿ with
ˆ ￿(￿00) = ￿(￿) and ˆ ￿0(￿00) = ￿�1￿0(￿)











= ￿(￿￿+1) � ￿(￿￿)
holds and with ￿00











































￿ = ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿00
￿+1￿￿￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿+1￿￿￿￿ has been used. This shows that ￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿
solves the transformed pricing system. By (8) and ˆ ￿(￿00) = ￿(￿), ￿00
￿ = ￿￿￿ follows, completing
the proof of (ii).
Proof: Proposition 1. Consider the location choice of the �rst entrant (￿ = 1), given
{￿￿}￿�0 satisfying (9) with prevailing ￿. Observe that ￿1 = 1 is not optimal since Bertrand
competition would imply �￿1(￿1) = 0 (regardless of ￿1) in this case, thus violating the free entry
condition. Hence, ￿ = 1 implies ￿1 ￿ ￿.
We show next that ￿1 ￿ ￿ holds for some ￿ large enough. Assume not: ￿1 � ￿ for all ￿ � 1.
This implies ￿1 � � as ￿ � �. Consider this limit case, where ￿￿ = 0 for ￿ � 0 and ￿￿ = �
for ￿ ￿ 1 must hold. In this case �rm 1 is e�ectively the monopolist in the market at all times
after the entry date ￿1. Consider a time ￿0 ￿ ￿1 with ￿1(￿0) ￿ 0 and denote the optimal price with
￿0. A consumer with valuation ￿ purchases ￿1 at price ￿0 if and only if ￿￿1 � ￿0. The cuto� at
the lower bound is thus v
¯
= max{￿min￿￿0￿￿}. If �rm 1 follows the pricing strategy ￿1(￿) = ￿￿￿￿0





(￿￿￿￿0 � ￿)￿ � ￿￿(￿�￿1)￿1(￿0)







is unbounded. This implies that ￿1(￿1) = 0 at entry date ￿1. (It implies even more: production
only becomes active at in�nite time after entry). But at the entry date, the discounted �ow of
pro�ts just covers the setup cost:
Z �
￿1
￿￿￿￿1(￿)￿￿ � ￿(￿) = 0
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must hold. Now, consider a potential entry at time ￿1 but at location ˜ ￿1 = ￿�￿￿￿1 (￿ ￿ 0). For
this strategy (whose payo� is denoted by ae), Lemma 1 implies
Z �
￿1




The factor ￿￿￿￿(￿�1) stems from the time shift of pro�ts associated with ˜ ￿ = ￿�￿￿(￿�1)￿. Total
pro�ts of this alternative strategy are thus positive
Z �
￿1






contradicting the initial assumption of ￿’s optimality. This shows that ￿1 ￿ ￿ holds for ￿ large
enough.
Together, with ￿1 ￿ ￿ at ￿ = 1 continuity, we conclude that there is a ￿ ￿ 1 so that ￿1 = ￿.
Denote this by ¯ ￿. At this ￿ = ¯ ￿, the �rm ￿ = 1 locates in the quality space, extending equal
relative spacing (9) to all ￿ ￿ 1.
Take the case of ￿ = ￿1 = ¯ ￿ and call the spacing problem of the remaining additional �rms
(￿ = 2￿3￿￿￿￿) the ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. With the notation
￿0
￿ = ￿￿+1 (￿ ￿ 1) ￿0
0 = ¯ ￿￿0 = ￿1 and ￿0 = ￿ + ￿�1(￿ ￿ 1)ln¯ ￿ (A1)
the residual spacing problem solves the corresponding system (13) - (15) above, where now all





























0￿￿�1¯ ￿￿￿0) = ¯ ￿￿￿(�
0(�)
0￿￿�1￿￿0). Hence,
¯ ￿￿ factors out of the right hand side of (13) and of the square brackets in (14). Consequently, the
solution of the residual spacing problem coincides with the original problem, implying ￿0
1 = ￿2 =
￿1 = ¯ ￿. A simple induction argument completes the proof that ￿￿ ￿ ¯ ￿ for all ￿ ￿ 1.
Finally, (10) and the transformation (A1) show that two consecutive entries occur at dates sat-
isfying ￿max(￿￿) = ¯ ￿￿�1￿max(￿￿+1). With (10), this is ￿￿(￿￿+1�￿￿) = ¯ ￿￿�1 and proves the second
statement.
Proposition 2. Substitution ￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ and recursive formulation (19) of the prices
gives
2[￿￿ + ￿￿￿] = ￿￿ +
1
￿ + 1





for ￿ ￿ 1. With ￿ = (1 + ￿)￿
£
2(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿¤
this is 2(￿ + 1)￿￿ = ￿￿+1 + ￿￿￿￿1. The
equation
￿2 ￿ 2(￿ + 1)￿ + ￿ = 0 (36)
has two roots, ￿ =
h
￿ + 1 +
p
￿2 + ￿ + 1
i
larger than unity and ￿ =
h
￿ + 1 ￿
p
￿2 + ￿ + 1
i
,
smaller than unity. The general solution to the recursive series is thus
￿￿ = ˜ ￿￿￿ + ˜ ￿￿￿ + ￿￿￿ (37)
where ˜ ￿ = 0 because of ￿ ￿ 1 and the transversality condition lim￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ = 0. Equation (19)
for ￿ = 0 is 2￿0 = ￿0 + (￿0 ￿ ￿￿1)￿max + ￿￿1 and implies
2
h
˜ ￿ + ￿￿0
i
= ￿0 + ￿0 (1 ￿ 1￿￿)￿max + ˜ ￿￿￿ + ￿￿￿1￿
Solving for ˜ ￿ and replacing ￿ = ˜ ￿￿￿0 proves (23).
Proof: Proposition 3. As a preparatory step, de�ne net pro�ts of the �rst entrant as a
function of existing spacing ￿, setup costs ￿, entry date ￿ and location choice ˆ ￿, while suppressing
dependence of � on parameters other than ￿ and normalizing ￿0 = 1:
�(￿￿￿￿ˆ ￿￿￿) = �(ˆ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿ (ˆ ￿)
Free entry implies that equilibrium entry date and location ￿￿(￿) and ￿￿(￿) satisfy
�(￿￿￿￿(￿)￿￿￿(￿)￿￿) = 0￿ (38)
for all ￿ and ￿ and optimal location choice implies
�￿￿(￿￿￿￿(￿)￿￿￿(￿)￿￿) = 0￿ (39)





























Now, taking derivatives of (39) w.r.t. ￿ leads to


































Equations (3) and (12) imply �￿￿|￿=¯ ￿ = ￿￿￿(¯ ￿) � ￿(￿�) and �￿￿￿￿|￿=¯ ￿ = ￿￿￿0(¯ ￿) � ￿￿￿(￿�) and


















The second order condition of (43) and the �rm’s optimization yields �￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0, while (17)
implies that the term in the square brackets is positive. Moreover, by de�nition of ￿�, �￿￿ ￿ 0
holds. Consequently, ¯ ￿(￿) is increasing (constant) in ￿ if and only if the expression in the slanted
brackets on the right is negative (zero).
￿￿￿ Whenever ￿(￿�) = 0 the expression on the right is zero and thus ¯ ￿ is constant in ￿. We
thus need to show that at the ERSE ￿ln(￿(￿�)￿￿(￿�))￿￿￿� ￿ 0 holds for ￿(￿�) ￿ 0. To this
aim, recall that ￿(￿) from (3) was assumed to satisfy ￿
£
￿(￿￿¯ ￿)¯ ￿￿¤
￿￿¯ ￿ � 0, or, with ￿ = ￿￿¯ ￿,




With pro�ts ￿1 = ￿(￿1 �￿1)(￿max �￿1)￿￿max and ￿1 = (￿1 � ￿0)￿(￿1 � ￿0) (compare (5) and (6),














where � ￿ � ￿￿￿￿￿1. With (5) and (19) (shifting up indices) this condition is
� ￿0 + ￿1 � � ￿1 ￿ ￿(￿1 � ￿1) (44)




2 �1 0 0
�(￿0 � ￿�1) 2(￿1 � ￿�1) �(￿1 � ￿0) 0
0 �(￿�1 � ￿�2) 2(￿0 � ￿�2) ￿￿￿



















2 ￿1 0 0
￿(￿0 ￿ ￿￿1) 2(￿1 ￿ ￿￿1) ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿0) 0
0 ￿(￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿2) 2(￿0 ￿ ￿￿2) ￿￿￿







0 0 0 0 ￿￿￿
0 2 ￿1 0



















2 ￿1 0 0
￿1 2(￿ + 1) ￿￿ 0
0 ￿1 2(￿ + 1) ￿￿
￿￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
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� �













Replicating the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain that � ￿￿ satis�es � ￿￿ = ￿￿ � ￿0 with ￿ = ￿ + 1 +
p
￿2 + ￿ + 1 for ￿ ￿ 0. The second row of (46) thus becomes
￿� ￿1 + [2(￿ + 1) ￿ ￿￿￿] � ￿0 = ￿� ￿1 + ￿� ￿0 = ￿￿
2￿0 ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿0
￿1 ￿ ￿0
where we have used that ￿ solves (36). Combining this equation with the �rst row of (46)
(2� ￿1 ￿ � ￿0 = � ￿1 + ￿max) leads to
[2￿ ￿ 1] � ￿0 = � ￿1 + ￿max ￿ 2￿
2￿0 ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿0
￿1 ￿ ￿0
= � ￿1 + ￿max ￿ 2
￿1 ￿ 2￿0 + ￿0
￿1 ￿ ￿0
where we used the second row of (45) in the last step. With ￿1 = (￿1 ￿ ￿0)￿(￿1 ￿ ￿0) and




















￿ [2￿ ￿ 4](� ￿1 ￿ ￿1)
¾
(47)
We show next that (44) holds for all ￿ ￿ [￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿] with ￿ ￿ 0 small enough and ￿￿￿ de�ned as
the date where ￿max = ￿1 holds. At this date we have ￿1 = ￿1 by (19) so that








+ [￿ ￿ 2](� ￿1 ￿ ￿1)
¸
￿ 0








for all ￿ ￿ 1, showing (44). By continuity, there is a ￿ ￿ 0 so that (44) holds for all ￿ ￿ [￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿].
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Now, since ￿1 from (24) is increasing in ￿, there is an ￿ ￿ 0 so that ￿ � (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿) holds whenever
￿1 ￿ ￿. This last condition holds for ￿ ￿ 0 small enough as �￿￿ ￿ 0 implies 0 ￿ �￿1 + ￿� or
￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿(¯ ￿) (48)
Finally, we restrict the pair of parameters (￿￿￿) to the compact set [0￿￿1]×[￿￿ ¯ ￿]. Hence, there are
￿min and ￿max with 1 ￿ ￿min ￿ ￿max ￿ � so that ¯ ￿ is restricted to the compact set [￿min￿￿max].
Consequently, there is a uniform ￿0 � ￿1 so that for all (￿￿￿) � [0￿￿1]×[￿￿ ¯ ￿] we have ￿1 ￿ ￿ and
(44) holds uniformly. This proves the statement.















and we have ￿￿(￿) = ￿￿￿￿￿ + ln(￿). As pro�ts from (24) are increasing in ￿, this implies that,
if ￿(￿￿)|￿=￿1 = 0 for ￿1 ￿ 0 decreases in ￿ leave ¯ ￿ unchanged and decrease ￿￿. Consequently,
￿(￿￿) = 0 holds for all ￿ ￿ ￿1.
Using ￿￿(￿) = ￿￿￿￿￿+ln(￿) and rescaling time we can write ￿￿(￿) = ln(￿). But by (24) there is
a ˜ ￿max � (0￿�) so that ￿+￿�1 = 0, implying that ￿1 = 0 marginally, and ￿1 ￿ 0 if ￿max ￿ ˜ ￿max.
Therefore, at entry cost ˜ ￿ � (˜ ￿max￿￿max(0))1￿￿ we have ￿￿(˜ ￿) = ￿￿1 ln(˜ ￿max￿￿max(0)) and
￿max(￿￿(˜ ￿)) = ˜ ￿max
Hence, ￿1 = 0 holds for all ￿ � ˜ ￿ and ￿1 ￿ 0 else. Together with (i) and (43) this proves the
statement.
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A.1 Table A1: List of data and Constructed Concordance
￿
Table A1 - Patenting, Demand Elasticity and Vertical Differentiation in 38 Industries 
Sector Name in Johnson (2002)  1998 Patents (in Thousands)  Concorded to Bils  Concorded to Broda et al. 2006 
DEN  FRA  DEU  ITA  NLD  UK   and Klenow (2001)  Elasticity of Subst.  HS Code
Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries  1  8  11  4  8  6  0  8.924688  30 
Growing of vegetables, horticultural  1  7  14  4  5  4  0  3.674227  70 
Growing of fruit, nuts, beverage  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  8.507714  80 
Growing of cereals and other  7  32  77  18  22  19  0  4.692318  100 
Manufacture of food products  22  88  231  66  123  84  0  3.923592  160 
Manufacture of tobacco products  0  4  20  8  1  7  0  5.284598  240 
Other mining and quarrying  0  2  6  1  1  1  0  2.304289  250 
Mining of metal ores  1  6  22  3  2  4  0  25.0319  260 
Mining of uranium and thorium  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1.162808  261 
Mining of coal and lignite  0  1  4  1  1  1  0  3.555673  270 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum  4  41  68  11  18  15  0  3.555673  270 
Extraction of crude petroleum, natural  2  57  96  14  24  36  0  3.733456  271 
Manufacture of chemical products  81  491  1411  170  254  427  0  1.276282  280 
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals  47  187  432  62  92  196  0  2.649367  300 
Manufacture of paints  1  20  91  6  14  15  0  5.003189  320 
Manufacture of soap  2  25  93  9  32  40  0  5.418962  340 
Manufacture of pesticides  4  25  68  11  9  20  0  6.257432  380 
Manufacture of rubber and plastics  12  114  436  78  67  74  0  1.340096  390 
Tanning and dressing of leather  0  23  25  29  5  4  0  10.12166  410 
Manufacture of wood products  3  20  74  17  7  9  1  5.239073  441 
Manufacture of paper products  4  32  229  31  21  35  0  3.417688  481 
Publishing, printing and reproduction  3  33  174  23  27  27  0  1.788363  490 
Manufacture of man-made fibers  1  12  45  8  6  8  0  6.020334  540 
Manufacture of textiles  3  34  156  33  16  23  0  6.020334  540 
Manufacture of wearing apparel  1  12  36  18  2  6  1  2.182875  610 
Manufacture of basic precious metals  0  14  49  7  3  7  1  2.029337  711 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel  1  25  101  24  5  13  0  2.955521  720 
Manufacture of fabricated metal  6  94  335  60  32  57  0  5.893758  730 
Casting of iron and steel  1  9  33  7  2  5  1  1.472366  732 
Casting of non-ferrous metals  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.878988  741 
Manufacture of machinery  48  737  2281  426  363  398  0  6.14374  840 
Manufacture of electrical machinery  1  18  40  6  7  7  0  9.124066  844 
Manufacture of office machinery  6  187  407  70  169  118  1  3.567555  847 
Manufacture of television, radio recvr.  1  65  157  20  112  41  1  2.844963  852 
Manufacture of radio, television  7  281  632  74  249  139  1  2.844963  852 
Manufacture of insulated wire, cable  18  40  6  7  7  1  0  4.764942  854 
Manufacture of electronic valves  95  248  35  60  37  3  0  4.764942  854 
Manufacture of railway  23  105  13  4  10  1  0  4.018861  860 
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